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I. INTRODUCTION
One of history's classic policy battles has been relentlessly fought between
those who pay reverence to free trade' and those who hold protectionism2
paramount. In 1994, after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
entered into force,3 protectionists sought to block terms of NAFTA4 designed to
facilitate cross-border trucking between Mexico and the United States.5 The
preservation of a U.S. moratorium on Mexico-domiciled trucking companies,
6fueled by protectionist attitudes under the guise of safety concerns, prevented
Mexican trucks from traveling beyond limited border commercial zones7 in the
United States and, subsequently, caused a breach of NAFTA. 8 In response,
President George W. Bush9 signed the Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002 ("Act of 2002") into law.'0 The Act of 2002
1. The term "free trade" means "a legal arrangement or national policy under which the exchange of
goods and services across international borders is neither restricted nor subsidized by techniques of government
intervention such as import tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies, [and] discriminatory regulations." Paul M.
Johnson, Glossary of Political Economy Terms (2000), at http://www.auburn.edu/-johnspm/gloss/freetrade.
html (last visited Mar. 8, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
2. The term "protectionism" means "political-economic doctrines... advocating that government
impose political barriers to international trade in order to 'protect' a domestic firm." Id.
3. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (2000) (noting that
NAFTA was entered into on December 17, 1992).
4. See North American Free Trade Agreement, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993), http://www.nafta-secalena.
org/english/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (establishing
rules under Chapter 12 of the Agreement to govern Cross-Border Trade in Services).
5. See Jason C. Messenger, Comment, Opening the U.S. -Mexico Border: Problems and Concerns for the
Bush Administration, the Country, and the Legal System to Consider, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 607, 609-10
(2002) (discussing the pressure from labor unions and the Democratic Party that persuaded the Clinton
Administration to delay Mexican trucks access beyond the border commercial zones).
6. See Hale E. Sheppard, The NAFTA Trucking Dispute: Pretexts for Noncompliance and Policy
Justifications for U.S. Facilitation of Cross-Border Services, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 235, 248 (2002)
(explaining that the strongest campaigns to prolong the moratorium came from public interest groups and
organized labor groups who argued that the U.S. obligations under NAFTA would jeopardize the safety of the
American public). It has been suggested that many of the groups in opposition to cross-border trucking had
ulterior motives such as job protectionism. Id. at 252-56.
7. See 49 C.F.R. § 372.241 (2003) (delineating a commercial zone as a municipality and a surrounding
area that is determined by the municipality's population). When a municipality has a population of one million
or more, the municipality and a 20-mile area around the municipality are exempt from the moratorium. Id.
§ 372.241(c)(7).
8. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S. v. Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01
(Final Report of the Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/trucking.pdf (last
visited Mar. 8, 2003) (copy of file with The Transnational Lawyer) (discussing whether the maintenance of the
moratorium is justified under either Article 1202 or Article 1203 of NAFTA).
9. George W. Bush is the 43rd President of the United States. Mention of Bush, the Bush
Administration, or the President in this Comment is in reference to George W. Bush unless otherwise
distinguished.
10. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-87, 115 Stat. 833, 864 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13902) (addressing cross-border trucking at
§ 350).
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contained measures designed to ensure safety on U.S. roads and honor NAFTA."
Subsequently, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration ("FMCSA"), 2 an
agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation, 3 implemented a border
operational plan and promulgated rules required by the Act of 2002.14 Finally, in
November of 2002, President Bush lifted the moratorium and authorized the
FMCSA to begin processing applications for Mexican long-haul trucking
operations. 5 Despite this apparent resolution to the NAFTA cross-border
trucking dispute, a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
prevents the FMCSA from using the promulgated rules required by the Act of
2002 to process Mexican applications. 6 As a result, Mexican trucking companies
are still prohibited from receiving FMCSA authority to operate beyond the
border commercial zones and the United States continues to breach its NAFTA
obligations.7
This Comment focuses on the border operational plan and safety regulations
for cross-border trucking between Mexico and the United States established by
the Act of 2002. It analyzes their capacity to satisfy four competing interests: the
free trade vision of NAFTA; the safety of U.S. roads; the commercial wants of
Mexican trucking firms; and the desires of protectionists. Part II provides the
11. Richard Simon, The World & Nation Deal Struck on Mexico Truckers' Access to U.S. NAFTA:
Accord by Lawmakers, White House Resolves Politically Sensitive Provision of 1993 Treaty, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2001, at A26.
12. Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 (1999)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)) (establishing the FMCSA); see also Fed. Motor Carrier Safety
Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., About Us, at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/aboutus/aboutus.html (last visited Oct.
27, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the FMCSA was established in
accordance with the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 to enforce motor carrier safety regulations).
All commercial motor carriers that wish to operate in the United States must be granted operational authority by
the FMCSA. Id. The FMCSA also assists in the development of compatible motor safety requirements and
procedures for cross-border trucking operations pursuant to NAFTA. Id.
13. See R. Dale Grinder, U.S. Dep't of Transp., The United States Department of Transportation: A
Brief History, at http://isweb.tasc.dot.gov/Historian/history.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2003) (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the Department of Transportation is the primary agency within the
federal government charged with shaping and administering polices to ensure safe and efficient transportation
systems). The Department of Transportation is a cabinet level executive department of the United States
government with fourteen individual operating administrations including the FMCSA. Id.
14. See Dave Longo, U.S. Dep't of Transp., North American Free Trade Agreement - U.S. Department
of Transportation Regulations, at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rulesregsMexican/NAFrA FactSheet.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (announcing the regulations issued to
govern Mexico-domiciled motor carriers applying to operate beyond the U.S.-Mexico border commercial
zones).
15. See Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the Secretary of
Transportation (Nov. 27, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/ l/print/20021127-6.html
[hereinafter Bush Memorandum] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (authorizing qualified motor
carriers domiciled in Mexico to obtain authority to provide cross-border trucking services in the United States
beyond the commercial zones).
16. See Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding the matter to
the Department of Transportation so that it may prepare a full Environmental Impact Statement and Clean Air
Act conformity determination for all three regulations).
17. See infra notes 272-90 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the 9th Circuit decision on
the cross-border provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations).
2003 / NAFTA Keep on Truckin'
background that shaped the cross-border trucking dispute, the implementation of
the border operational plan, and the regulatory scheme for Mexico-domiciled
motor carriers operating in the United States beyond the border commercial
zones.'8 Part III analyzes the post-moratorium disputes among the major
competing interests.' 9 These interests include complying with NAFTA, ensuring
safety on U.S. roads, placing a heavy burden on Mexican trucking firms, and the
continued efforts by protectionists to block Mexican long-haul trucking. Finally,
Part IV concludes that the border operational plan and related regulations will not
fully resolve the NAFTA cross-border trucking dispute because even if Mexican
trucking firms can afford compliance, the protectionists will not be satisfied until
the cost of compliance discourages Mexican trucks from making the long-haul
into the United States.
II. THE LONG-HAUL TO REACH THE UNITED STATES
A roadmap of the past twenty years of U.S. policy toward Mexican trucking
is necessary to understand the current struggle in resolving the post-moratorium
dispute. It includes a discussion on the background that shaped the cross-border
trucking dispute and an explanation of the FMCSA's border operational plan.
More important, it provides an outline of the FMCSA's regulatory scheme for
Mexico-domiciled motor carriers that wish to operate in the United States beyond
the designated commercial zones.
A. Background
Prior to 1982, U.S. transportation policy permitted Mexican trucks to operate
in the United States]° That policy was changed by the enactment of the Bus
Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 ("BRRA"). 2' The BRRA imposed a moratorium
22on the application process for Mexico-domiciled motor carriers that soughtpermission to operate in the United States. 3 Mexican trucks could not operate in
18. See infra notes 20-168 and accompanying text (describing the reasons that led the United States to
lift its moratorium for Mexico-domiciled trucks in order to implement the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations).
19. See infra notes 168-290 and accompanying text (setting for the competing concerns that affected the
post-moratorium policy established by the Act of 2002).
20. See NAFTA: Arbitration Panel Decision and Safety Issues with Regard to Opening the U.S./Mexican
Border to Motor Carriers: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Highways and Transit, 107th Cong. (2001)
[hereinafter NAFTA Hearing] (explaining that the United States did not distinguish between U.S. and foreign
motor carriers when granting operational authority).
21. See Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 6(g), 96 Stat. 1102 (1982)
(amending 49 U.S.C. § 10922 by adding subsections I and 2).
22. See 49 C.F.R. § 368.2 (2003) (defining a Mexico-domiciled motor carrier as a motor carrier of
property whose principle place of business is located in Mexico).
23. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 237-38 (explaining that the Bus Regulatory Reform Act placed a two
year moratorium on the issuance of new operating permits for foreign domiciled motor carriers, but authorized
the President to lift the moratorium if in the national interest). The moratorium on Canadian trucks was
immediately lifted after reaching an agreement on reciprocal truck access. Id.
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the United States without first obtaining federal permission. Mexico's refusal to
give U.S. trucks reciprocal access to the Mexican domestic trucking market was
• 25
the motivation for implementing the moratorium. The BRRA made some
exceptions to the moratorium, giving Mexican trucks limited access to U.S-
Mexico border municipalities in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.26
Nevertheless, the prohibition on processing applications for operating authority
27throughout the United States remained.
More than a decade after the enactment of the BRRA, the United States,
Mexico, and Canada established a free trade area under a trilateral agreement
called NAFTA. 28 The purpose of NAFTA was to eliminate barriers to trade and
facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and services. 29 Thus, U.S. policy
toward Mexican trucking had to be consistent with the principles of NAFTA.3° In
accordance with "Annex 1" of NAFTA,3" the U.S. moratorium on Mexican motor
carriers had to be incrementally lifted to give Mexican trucks access to U.S.
border states by 1997 and complete access to the United States by the year
2000.32
During the Clinton Administration, strong political pressure slowed the
progress toward lifting the moratorium.33 Opposition 34 to U.S. obligations under
24. Id.
25. See Stephen T. Weisweaver, Comment, International Trade Partners, Politics, and Promises: An
Analysis of the North American Free Trade Agreement's Arbitral Panel Decision Concerning the United States-
Mexico Trucking Dispute, 32 N.M. L. REV. 471, 472-73 (2002) (discussing the United States' motivations for
imposing the moratorium). The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 essentially eliminated regulatory barriers that
distinguished Mexican motor carriers from U.S. domestic motor carriers. Id.
26. See 49 C.F.R. § 368.1 (2003) (setting forth rules for issuance of Certification of Registration to those
Mexican motor carriers that wish to operate exclusively in the border commercial zones); see also Revisions of
Regulations and Application Form for Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers to Operate in U.S. Municipalities and
Commercial Zones of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 67 Fed. Reg. 12,652 (Mar. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 368) (explaining the revisions to part 368). Although these revisions may have a significant impact on
trucking in the border commercial zones, discussion of them is outside the focus of this Comment.
27. See Trucking Safety: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Highways and Transit, 107th Cong.
(2001) (explaining that the FMCSA issues and enforces regulations governing the operation and maintenance of
motor carriers in interstate transportation).
28. North American Free Trade Agreement § 101, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
29. id. § 102(a).
30. Id. § 105.
31. See id. at Annex 1 (establishing a schedule for phasing out reservations on existing measures).
Specifically, the moratorium on cross-border trucking to California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas was
scheduled for elimination three years after the date NAFTA entered into force. Id. Full access to the United
States was scheduled to take effect six years after the date of entry into force of NAFTA. Id.
32. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 237 (explaining that the annex is a reservation that preserved the
moratorium after NAFTA went into force to allow time to adjust to the new requirements).
33. See Messenger, supra note 5, at 609-10 (explaining that the Clinton Administration delayed
implementation of NAFTA's trucking provisions because of safety concerns and inadequate harmonization
between U.S. and Mexican trucking standards); see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478, 1481
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (challenging a regulation by the Federal Highway Administration to implement U.S.
recognition of Mexican commercial driver's licenses).
34. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 248-52 (discussing the arguments forwarded by Public Citizens,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations).
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NAFTA rested on the belief that trucks governed by lower regulatory standards
in Mexico would rumble into the United States and create safety hazards on U.S.
highways.35 Opponents cited the major areas where Mexican regulations would
negatively impact U.S. highway safety, including the absence of hours-of-service
regulations," less stringent weight restrictions on trailer cargo, 37 and fewer safety
standards for trucks.38 In addition, a General Accounting Office39 report published
in 2001 claimed that the Department of Transportation had not developed an
adequate operational plan to ensure that Mexican trucks crossing the border
would meet U.S. safety standards)n° The safety issue effectively prevented
Mexican trucks from gaining access beyond the border commercial zones
because the consequences for violating NAFTA obligations dimmed in
comparison to the imagery of Mexican trucks killing Americans on U.S. roads.4'
Despite the trucking dispute, trade between Mexico and the United States
exploded during the first ten years of NAF'A.42 U.S. exports to Mexico increased by
ninety-three percent and U.S. imports from Mexico rose by 190%. 41 This represented
more than just an increase in the quantity of goods traded,44 it also represented a
growing number of new industries willing to participate in the integrated market
35. See id. at 246-47 (referring to a 1996 GAO report). The report found that half of all Mexican trucks
attempting to cross the border did not meet U.S. standards. Id. at 247. The report also found that trucking
regulations in Mexico placed no limits on hours-of-service for drivers and permitted trailers to carry 20% more
than would be allowed by U.S. weight restrictions. Id.
36. See Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Proposed Hours-of-Service, at
http://www.fmcsa.dot.govfhos/hos.html (last visited Feb. I1, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (explaining that hours-of-service regulations were established to reduce the potential safety hazards
equated with fatigued drivers). There is evidence that many crashes occur as a result of driver fatigue caused by
work conditions. Id.
37. See TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD REPORT 267, REGULATIONS OF WEIGHTS, LENGTH AND
WIDTH OF COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLES 13 (2002) (indicating that federal size and weight restrictions
influence highway construction and maintenance costs and highway accident losses).
38. Sheppard, supra note 6, at 248-52.
39. See U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Homepage, at http://www.gao.gov/main.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2003)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the General Accounting Office is the audit,
evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress). The General Accounting Office's activities are designed to
ensure the executive branch's accountability to Congress. Id.
40. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO Report No. 02-238, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
COORDINATED OPERATIONAL PLAN NEEDED TO ENSURE MEXICAN TRUCKS COMPLIANCE WITH U.S.
STANDARDS 12 (2001) [hereinafter GAO Report No. 02-238].
41. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 250-52 (referencing a Teamsters spokesperson who suggested that the
United States ignore the NAFTA panel's mandate regardless of the economic consequences because human life
is priceless).
42. See Daniel T. Griswold, NAFTA at 10: An Economic and Foreign Policy Success, CENTER FOR
TRADE POL'Y STUD. (Dec. 2002), at http://www.freetrade.org (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(referring to trade between Mexico and the United States which has increased from $81 billion to $232 billion
since 1993).
43. See RUSSELL HILLBERRY & CHRISTINE MCDANIEL, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. NO. 3527,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW 2-3 (May-June 2002) (comparing U.S. trade with that of the NAFTA
partners, which has increased by 78% to a 43% trade increase with the rest of the world).
44. See id. at 2 (employing a methodology that analyzes trade growth by three factors: changes in
quantity traded; changes in price; and variety of the goods).
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between NAFrA partners.45 NAFTA was also a foreign policy success because
Mexico turned toward a more stable economic system.8 Furthermore, NAFTA's
41
success during this period did not come at the expense of the U.S. domestic economy.
Notwithstanding the trade growth among NAFTA partners, the cross-border
trucking dispute weakened the full potential of NAFTA.48 The moratorium on cross-
border truck traffic continued to make the movement of goods between Mexico and
the United States more difficult because it prevented Mexican trucks from obtaining
authority to travel beyond designated commercial zones along the U.S.-Mexico
border.49 The commercial zone exception' ° allowed Mexican trucks to operate up to
twenty miles5' beyond the U.S.-Mexico border without a grant of FMCSA authority,S 52
which was otherwise prohibited by the moratorium. Without FMCSA authority
goods must be trucked across the border exclusively by a drayage system.53 The
drayage system's three-step process requires three trucks, three drivers, and two
transfer stations to move goods across the border. First, a Mexican long-haul truck
transports the goods from the interior of Mexico to a Mexican transfer yard near the
border.55 Next, the goods are transferred to a Mexican drayage truck and transported
across the border to a transfer yard in the United States.56 Finally, a U.S. long-haul
truck takes the cargo to its U.S. destination.57 In addition to the extra time and
45. See id. at 4 (suggesting that an increase in the variety of goods traded between partners shows an
expanding international trade market).
46. See Griswold, supra note 42, at http://www.freetrade.org (explaining that since the signing of
NAFTA, Mexico has made economic and political reforms that have been instrumental in avoiding the
economic disasters common in the 1980s). Mexico now has one of the most stable and dynamic economies in
Latin America. Id.
47. See id. (explaining that while some U.S. industries have moved to Mexico, other U.S. industries
have expanded and created better paying job in the United States).
48. See NAFTA Hearing, supra note 20 (estimating that trucks move 80% of freight between Mexico
and the United States); see also Jeffery Atik, National Treatment in the NAFTA Trucking Case, 42 S. TEX. L.
REV. 1249 (2001) (stating that cross-border trucking is an essential service for establishing a North American
free trade market and that the major border crossings are chokeholds on NAFTA potential).
49. See Atik, supra note 48, at 1249 (explaining that a large percentage of trade between Mexico and the
United States is transported by truck).
50. See 49 U.S.C. § 13506(b)(1) (2000) (exempting from the FMCSA's jurisdiction, unless otherwise
necessary, transportation provided entirely in a municipality, in contiguous municipalities, or in a zone adjacent
to and commercially a part of the municipality or municipalities).
51. See 49 C.F.R. § 372.241 (2003) (defining commercial zones as an area exempt from all provisions of
49 U.S.C. subtit. IV, pt. B). A commercial zone is a municipality and a surrounding area that is determined by
the municipality's population. Id. When the base municipality has a population of one million or more, the
municipality and a 20-mile area surrounding municipality are exempt. Id. § 372.241 (c)(7).
52. See 49 U.S.C. § 13506(b)(1) (2000). But see 49 C.F.R. § 368.1 (2003) (requiring Mexico-domiciled
motor carriers to apply to the FMCSA and receive a Certificate of Registration before providing interstate
transportation in the border commercial zones).
53. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 258 (using the term drayage to describe a truck that operates
exclusively in the commercial border zone and is used only to transfer goods across the border).
54. See id. (describing the three step process).
55. Id. Long-haul trucks are used to transport goods over long distances while drayage trucks are used to
shuttle goods over short distances. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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expense associated with the drayage system, a substantial number of safety violations
can be linked to the older drayage trucks used in the process.58 Under the drayage
system, thirty-seven percent of Mexican trucks fail state inspections" at the U.S.-
Mexico border crossings and are put out-of-service as a result.
The continued delay to lift the moratorium caused the United States to miss
the deadlines set by NAFTA to provide unfettered cross-border trucking
service.61 Frustrated by the United States' delay to lift the moratorium and expand
access to U.S. roads, the Mexican government requested a NAFTA arbitration
panel to resolve the dispute. 62 The NAFTA arbitration panel released its final
report in February of 2001, finding that the United States was not in compliance
with its NAFTA obligations." The report held that the U.S. moratorium against
the issuance of new motor carrier operating permits to Mexican motor carriers
constituted a breach of its NAFTA obligations.6' The report made it clear that the
United States was treaty-bound to accord Mexico-domiciled motor carriers
access to the U.S. markets for cross-border trucking services. 65 Annex 166 of
NAFTA expressly fixed a schedule for phasing out the moratorium67 without
regard to the disparity between Mexican and U.S. trucking standards.68 When the
phase-out period expired, the United States was obligated to give Mexico
domiciled trucking firms an opportunity to operate in the United States consistent
58. See id. (explaining that simple economics dictate that Mexican motor carriers are not going to
dedicate their best trucks, most experienced drivers, and maintenance resources to travel only a few miles).
59. See Messenger, supra note 5, at 621 (comparing the Mexican failure rate to a U.S. national average
failure rate of 24%).
60. See id. (explaining that there is a significant disparity in failure rates between the four border states).
California has a 27% failure rate compared to 40% in Arizona, 34% in New Mexico, and 41% in Texas. Id.
61. See North American Free Trade Agreement Annex 1, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
62. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 238 (discussing Mexico's use of NAFTA Article 2008 to solicit the
formation of an arbitration panel in order to resolve the dispute).
63. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S. v. Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-
01, para. 295 (Final Report of the Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/
trucking.pdf (determining unanimously that the United States' blanket refusal to review Mexican applications
for operating authority was, and remains, a breach of the U.S. obligations under Annex 1).
64. See id. at para. 300 (explaining that the review of the Mexican carrier applications had to be done on
a case-by-case basis).
65. See Atik, supra note 48, at 1252-53 (discussing the NAFI'A arbitration panel decision that found the
phase-out commitments under Annex I to be unconditional). The United States was not given an extension of
the timetable to continue effort to create parity between the Mexican regulatory regime and the U.S. regime. Id.
66. See North American Free Trade Agreement Annex 1.
67. See C. O'Neal Taylor, Mexican Trucking Case and NAFTA: Introduction, Commentary and
Afterward, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2001) (explaining that Annex 1 of NAFTA is an obligation to phase
out reservations to provisions on trade in services and investments). The United States' obligations under Annex
I provided express terms for Mexican operating authority in cross-border trucking service throughout the
United States six years from the date NAFTA entered into force. Id. at 1242. The phase out deadline was
January 1,2000. Id.
68. See Atik, supra note 48, at 1250 (noting that the degree of disparity could be a debated issue for
applying national treatment because the standard of" in like circumstance" for service providers is not clearly
defined). However, the fact that there has been significant litigation over the same language in the trade of
goods regime, under GATT, could be used by analogy to interpret the standard of in like circumstance in trade
of services regime. Id.
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with its NAFTA obligations.69 However, the NAFTA arbitration panel's report
also stated that the United States could impose different regulations on Mexican
carriers as long as they were applied in good faith to address legitimate safety
concerns and in full compliance with all relevant NAFTA provisions. °
The required response to the NAFTA arbitration panel's final report was
continued negotiation between the parties.7' Within thirty days of the final report,
Mexico and the United States should have reached a resolution that included
removal of the moratorium.7" Because the parties did not achieve this goal,
Mexico was authorized to suspend benefits of equivalent effect against the
United States.73 Suspension of benefits was not limited to the same sector, i.e.,
U.S. truck access to Mexico, if such action would not be effective.74 However,
any suspension of benefits would have had to sting in order to stimulate an
effective resolution.75 Suspension of truck access to Mexico would have been
ineffective as there were no U.S. cross-border trucking operations into Mexico,
and suspension of other NAFTA benefits might have hurt Mexico more than the
United States." The more biting incentive for the United States to resolve the
dispute was the danger of wrecking its international reputation.
7n
Within three months of the NAFTA arbitration panel's final report, the Bush
administration and the Department of Transportation drafted regulations designed78 79
to comply with NAFTA. 7' The responsive action postponed Mexican sanctions.
However, the regulations came under immediate attack from Congress"' and non-
governmental organizations." It was argued that the Department of Transportation's
regulations did not sufficiently address the safety issues posed by Mexican motor
69. See Taylor, supra note 67, at 1243 (indicating that the NAFTA arbitration panel's decision was not
concerned with the motivation for extending the moratorium).
70. In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S. v. Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01,
para. 301 (Final Report of the Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ enforcement/trucking.pdf
71. See Weisweaver, supra note 25, at 483 (explaining that the Chapter 20 dispute resolution process,
which occurred in this case, eventually comes back to party negotiation).
72. See North American Free Trade Agreement § 2018(2), 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (setting forth that
whenever possible a resolution shall include removal of the measure not conforming with the agreement).
73. See id. § 2019(1) (setting forth that the parties have 30 days from receipt of the final report to agree
on a resolution pursuant to the panel recommendations).
74. See id. § 2019(2) (setting forth the considerations for the suspension of benefits).
75. See Weisweaver, supra note 25, at 485 (explaining that effective resolution depends on the
bargaining power between the parties).
76. See id. (explaining that Mexico gains economically from NAFTA trade benefits).
77. Id.
78. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 240-41 (referring to May 2001 proposed regulations to be added to
the Code of Federal Regulations at title 49, part 365).
79. See id. (mentioning that Mexico would not impose sanctions as long as conciliatory efforts
continued).
80. See id. at 241 (discussing the Sabo Amendment proposed in the House of Representatives to block
all funding necessary to process applications by Mexican carriers).
81. See id. at 249-50 (discussing the organized labor groups' use of safety issues to oppose the presence
of Mexican trucks on U.S. highways).
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carriers." In response, Congress introduced several proposals in order to force a
more restrictive regulatory scheme," but it was questionable whether these
proposals would be NAFTA compliant.m Congress focused on the language used
in the NAFTA arbitration panel's final report which suggested that Mexican
motor carriers did not necessarily have to be treated exactly the same as U.S.S 85
domestic motor carriers. The Bush administration was committed to enacting
regulations that would not violate NAFTA and promised to veto any legislation
that did not meet that goal. 6 In December of 2001, a compromise was reached
and the President signed the Act of 2002." Section 350 of this legislation was
crafted to address safety concerns while also complying with NAFTA
• 88
commitments.
B. Implementation of the Cross-Border Trucking Operational Plan
One important step toward resolving the NAFTA trucking dispute was the
implementation of an effective border operational plan. The Act of 2002 imposed
requirements that the FMCSA had to implement before funding could be
expended to issue permits to Mexican trucking firms.89 The FMCSA was required
to have a certified 9 system of safety procedures in place before provisional
operating authority could be granted to Mexican motor carriers. 9' The Act of
2002 required the FMCSA to issue rules governing the application process and
92
safety monitoring system for Mexico-domiciled motor carriers. The Act of 2002
82. See id. at 243 (explaining that the proposed regulations permitted Mexican trucks to operate in the
United States for up to eighteen months without review).
83. See id. (discussing the proposed Sabo Amendment introduced in the House and the Murray
Amendment introduced in the Senate).
84. See id. at 242 (referring to Congressmen Sabo's declaration that his proposed amendment was
probably not NAFTA compliant because it maintained a total prohibition on Mexican carriers).
85. See id. at 244 (citing Senator Murray's belief that her proposed amendment was NAFTA compliant).
86. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet on Trucking (July 25, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/print20010905-8.html (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
87. Press Release, White House, President Signs Transportation Appropriation Act (Dec. 18, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 1/12/20011218-4.html (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer).
88. See Jeffery Price, Update: Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of
2002, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 277 (2002) (indicating that the Act of 2002 appeared to be a definitive step
toward NAFTA compliance).
89. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-87, § 350(a), 115 Stat. 833, 864 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13902) (prohibiting the use of
funding for processing applications by a Mexican motor carrier until the conditions of the Act of 2002 were
implemented by the FMCSA).
90. See id. § 350(c)(2) (requiring the Secretary of Transportation to certify in writing that the opening of
the border does not pose an unacceptable safety risk to the American public).
91. See id. § 350(c)(1)(A)-(H) (setting forth the conditions that the FMCSA must meet to satisfy the
operational plan mandated by the Act of 2002).
92. See id. § 350(a)(1)-(2); see also infra notes 127-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations for Mexico-domiciled carriers).
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also required commercial border crossings to have the necessary personnel93 and
infrastructure 94 to ensure that opening the border would not pose unacceptable
safety risks to the American public. 95 This included rules to initially certify and
maintain certification of safety auditors, safety investigators, and safety
inspectors. It also required installation of state of the art weigh-in-motion
scales97 at the busiest commercial crossings98 and a system to electronically verify
the status and validity of Mexican driver's licenses and operating permits. 99 Each
of these requirements had to be verified by the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General ("IG")I°° and certified in writing by the Secretary of
Transportation.
1. The Inspector General Review
While the FMCSA executed the requirements mandated by the Act of 2002,
the IG reviewed their progress.'2 The purpose of the IG review was to audit and
verify that basic safeguards would be in place before the border opened to new
long-haul motor carriers and then report the findings to the Secretary of
93. See Implementation of Commercial Motor Carrier Safety Requirements at the U.S.-Mexico Border:
Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Transportation, Comm. on Appropriations and the Senate Subcomm.
on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th
Cong. (2002) (statement of Norman Mineta, Secretary, Dep't of Transp.) [hereinafter Mineta Statement]
(explaining that the border-crossing regulations are enforced by three distinct groups of inspectors). Safety
auditors conduct required safety audits before Mexican motor carriers can be issued eighteen-month provisional
authority to operate beyond the commercial zone. Id. Safety inspectors conduct roadside inspections of vehicles
and drivers as they cross the border. Id. Safety investigators conduct compliance reviews during the eighteen-
month provisional period to evaluate the Mexican carrier's operational history. Id.
94. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002 § 350(c)(I)(F)
(explaining that the border crossings must have adequate capacity to conduct a sufficient number of meaningful
vehicle safety inspections and accommodate out-of-service vehicles).
95. See id. § 350(c)(2) (providing that the Secretary of Transportation should base his decision to certify
the opening of the border on the Inspector General's findings).
96. See Certification of Safety Audits, Safety Investigators, and Safety Inspectors; Final Rule, 67 Fed.
Reg. 12,775, 12,777 (Mar. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 385, subpt. C) (explaining that training
standards were unchanged by the Act of 2002 and do not present a new burden on the FMCSA). Personnel are
trained in accordance with standards provided for in the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999. Id.
97. See Why WIM?, WEIGH IN MOTION, at http://www.weighinmotion.com/whyWim.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that Weigh-In-Motion is a scales
system that allows enforcement officials to accurately inspect every truck's weight as it passes at speeds up to
55 mph).
98. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002 § 350(a)(7).
99. See id. § 350(c)(I)(E)-(H) (requiring an information infrastructure to ensure effective monitoring of
the application process and enforcement of regulations by U.S. law enforcement). The information
infrastructure requirements include a telecommunication system to access information from the Mexican
government and a comprehensive database to electronically verify the status and validity of licenses, vehicle
registration, operating authority, and insurance information. Id.
100. See id. § 350(c)(1) (calling for a comprehensive review of the border operations within 180 days of
enactment).
101. Id. § 350(c)(2).
102. Memorandum from Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, to the Secretary of Transportation (June
25, 2002) [hereinafter Mead Memorandum].
2003/NAFTA Keep on Truckin'
Transportation, as required by the Act of 2002.03 The IG report grouped the
requirements mandated by the Act of 2002 into three major categories: the hiring
and training of FMCSA personnel, the adequacy of border inspection facilities,
and development of the information safety monitoring system'O The IG
concluded that the FMCSA had substantially completed the requirements of the
Act of 2002.05 A majority of the incomplete portions were scheduled for
completion within sixty days of the IG review.3 The IG report recommended
that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FMCSA to provide weekly updates
on its progress toward completing the actions required by the Act of 2002.'°7
At the time of the IG report, the FMCSA planned to have 198 of the 214 new
border inspectors assigned by July 31, 2002.1°8 The IG found that the FMCSA
had hired 138 of the 144 safety inspectors and trained all but thirty.'3 The
FMCSA had also hired ninety-one auditors to process the pre-authorization
applications of which fifty were trained." Hiring of compliance review
investigators was planned, although it was not required until January of 2003. "1
The IG review also verified that personnel had not been transferred from other
parts of the United States. 12 These findings confirmed that the FMCSA had
substantially complied with the hiring and training requirements mandated by the
Act of 2002.
The IG review found that significant improvements had been made to border
crossing inspection facilities." 3 It verified that twenty-three of the twenty-five
commercial border crossings were sufficiently equipped for inspectors to enforce
the requirements of the Act of 2002.114 The FMCSA initiated plans for
improvements at the two other crossings and anticipated compliance within sixty
days of the report."5 The IG review also verified that weigh-in-motion scales
103. Implementation of Commercial Motor Carrier Safety Requirements at the U.S.-Mexico Border:
Hearing Before Senate Subcomm. on Transportation, Comm. on Appropriations and the Senate Subcomm. on
Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement of Kenneth Mead, Inspector General, Dep't of Transp.) [hereinafter Mead Statement].
104. Id. at 2.
105. See Mead Memorandum, supra note 102, at 4 (stating that the Secretary of Transportation
conceded that some work still needs to be done but expects compliance).
106. Mead Statement, supra note 103, at 3.
107. Mead Memorandum, supra note 102, at 16.
108. Mead Statement, supra note 103, at 4.
109. See id. (estimating that all inspectors should be hired and trained by July 31, 2002).
110. Id. Although the FMCSA goal was only to hire 67 auditors, additional auditors were hired to ensure
adequate personnel. Id.
I 11. See id. (adding that any immediate need for a compliance review could be handled by existing
personnel).
112. See id. (explaining that transfer of personnel was prohibited by § 350(c)(1)(C) of the Act of 2002);
see also Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-87,
§ 350(c)(1)(C), 115 Stat. 833, 864 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13902) (stating that transferring
personnel would undermine the level of inspector coverage and safety in other regions of the country).
113. Mead Memorandum, supra note 102, at 4.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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were in place at six of the highest volume border crossings and that a plan was in
place to install the remaining four by December 2002."6 Portable or static scales
suitable for enforcement were located at all twenty-five commercial border
crossings."7 These findings confirmed that the FMCSA had substantially
complied with the infrastructure requirements mandated by the Act of 2002.
The IG also tested the capability of the information safety monitoring
system."' It determined that Mexico's database accurately provided the necessary
information to verify the status of Mexican driver's licenses and vehicle license
plates." 9 In addition, the IG tested the U.S. database used to verify operational
authority and valid insurance.' 20 Of the twenty-five border crossings, six could
not access the Mexican and U.S. databases.' 2' All mobile enforcement units had
access to the Mexican database and were expected to have access to the U.S.
database within thirty days of the report."2 These findings confirmed that the
FMCSA had substantially complied with the information system requirements
mandated by the Act of 2002.
2. Lifting the Moratorium
Satisfied with the IG report findings on the FMCSA's implementation of the
requirements mandated by the Act of 2002, the Secretary of Transportation
certified in writing that the opening of the border did not pose unacceptable
safety risks. 23 Subsequently, the President lifted the twenty year-old moratorium
that prevented the FMCSA from processing Mexican motor carrier applications
for operating authority.' 24 The Secretary of Transportation ordered the FMCSA to
start processing Mexican applications under the appropriate procedures mandated
by the Act of 2002 and promulgated in the Code of Federal Regulations. '25 These
actions ended the moratorium and replaced it with a process designed to review
116. See id. (meeting the requirement to have five weigh-in-motion scales in place before processing
applications).
117. Id.
118. Mead Statement, supra note 103.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. (indicating that the issue would be addressed within 60 days of the report). At one of the
border crossings, the inspector did not have a password to access the database. Id. At three border crossings,
telecommunication links had not yet been installed. Id. At the remaining two, inspectors were not yet assigned.
Id.
122. Id.
123. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-87, § 350(c)(2), 115 Stat. 833, 864 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13902) (requiring that the
Secretary of Transportation to certify the opening of the border in a manner addressing the Inspector General's
findings).
124. Bush Memorandum, supra note 15, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/2002/11 1printl
20021127-6.html.
125. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., U.S. Transportation Department Implements NAFA
Provisions for Mexican Trucks, Buses (Nov. 27, 2002), at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dotl0702.htm (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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Mexican motor carrier applications on a case-by-case basis in accordance with
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the NAFTA arbitration panel's recommendations.
C. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations for Mexico-Domiciled Carriers
An important component of the post-moratorium operational plan is a regulatory
scheme that governs Mexico-domiciled motor carriers operating beyond the U.S.-
Mexico border commercial zones."' Mexican motor carriers are required to meet the
same regulatory standards as U.S. domiciled motor carriers. 2 However, the Act of
2002 required the FMCSA to make additional regulations only applicable to
Mexican motor carriers before granting permanent operating authority'29 in order to
ensure compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.'o To achieve
this mandate, the FMCSA promulgated special entry regulations to govern the
application process and the preliminary operational authority for Mexican carriers. 3'
The regulatory scheme requires Mexican carriers to submit to two stages of review in
order to achieve permanent operating authority beyond the designated commercialS 132
zones along the U.S.-Mexico border. Initially, Mexican carriers must pass a pre-
authorization safety audit.' Next, during an eighteen-month period of provisional
operating authority in the United States, Mexican carriers are subject to an
oversight program to monitor compliance with the applicable Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations.' After completing two steps of review, permanent operating
authority is granted with an extended thirty-six-month inspection component.'36 The
126. See generally infra notes 127-67 and accompanying text (discussing the regulatory scheme that
governs Mexico-domiciled motor carriers operating in the United States beyond the border commercial zones).
127. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002 §§ 350(a)(I)-(2).
128. See 49 C.F.R. § 390.3 (2003) (setting forth that the rules in this chapter are applicable to all
employers, employees, and commercial motor vehicles transporting property or passengers in interstate
commerce).
129. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002
§§ 350(a)(1)(A), (2) (requiring a safety examination that must be verified by the FMCSA before operational
authority is granted, and a compliance review must be completed within eighteen months of granting
conditional authority).
130. See 49 C.F.R. § 385.3 (2003) (indicating that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations are
contained in 49 C.F.R. pts. 350-99).
131. Application by Certain Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers to Operate Beyond United States
Municipalities and Commercial Zones on the United States-Mexico Border, 67 Fed. Reg. 12,702 (Mar. 19,
2002) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 365); see also Safety Monitoring System and Compliance Initiative for
Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers Operating in the United States, 67 Fed. Reg. 12,758 (Mar. 19, 2002) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 385).
132. See 49 C.F.R. § 365 (2003) (adding subpart E to part 365 in order to provide special rules
governing the application process of Mexico-domiciled motor carriers); see also 49 C.F.R. § 385 (2003) (adding
subpart B to part 385 in order to establish a safety monitoring system governing Mexico-domiciled carriers).
133. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text (outlining the components of a pre-authorization
safety audit).
134. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (explaining provisional operating authority).
135. See infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text (discussing the safety monitoring program for
Mexico-domiciled motor vehicles).
136. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (discounting the 36-month inspection component of
permanent operating authority).
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Act of 2002 requires compliance with these rules before the FMCSA is authorized to
spend funds on the application process."'
1. Pre-Authorization Safety Audit
Before Mexican carriers are granted provisional operating authority to
provide trucking services between Mexico and the United States, they must
undergo a pre-authorization safety audit designed to guarantee compliance with
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.'38 Fifty percent of all the safety
audits must be conducted at the Mexico-domiciled carrier's principal place of
business, and the on-site inspections must cover at least fifty percent of the
estimated cross-border trucking traffic. 3 9 In addition, all Mexican motor carriers
must demonstrate the required safety management controls to successfully
complete the audit. 40 A motor carrier will not be granted provisional authority if
the FMCSA fails to verify the following safety management controls: an
appropriate drug and alcohol testing program,"4' a system of compliance to
enforce hours-of-service rules,' 2 proof of financial responsibility,' records of
periodic vehicle inspections and maintenance,"" and the qualifications of each
driver expected to operate under the provisional authority. 4' A Mexican motor
carrier's application can be denied if the FMCSA finds inadequate safety
management controls in at least three separate factors.' 6 Once the carrier has
established the basic safety management controls, the FMCSA must grant
preliminary authority to operate in the United States.147
137. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
87, § 350(a), 115 Stat. 833, 864 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13902).
138. See 49 C.F.R. § 365.507(c) (2003) (providing a safety audit during the application process to be
used as a tool to determine whether provisional operating authority should be granted).
139. 49 C.F.R. § 365 subpt. E app. A.l(b) (2003).
140. See 49 C.F.R. § 365.507(c) (2003) (assessing the adequacy of the carrier's basic safety
management controls in accordance with the criteria in Appendix A to subpt. E of part 365).
141. See 49 C.F.R. § 365 subpt. E app. A.lll(a)(i) (2003) (verifying that the Mexican carrier's drug and
alcohol program is consistent with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations standards and procedures set
forth in title 49, part 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
142. See 49 C.F.R. § 365 subpt. E app. A.l1l(a)(2) (2003) (specifying that hours-of-service rules are
limits on the duration of time and conditions under which drivers may operate their commercial vehicles in
accordance with title 49, part 395 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
143. 49 C.F.R. § 365 subpt. E app. A.III(a)(3) (2003).
144. 49 C.F.R. § 365 subpt. E app. A.lII(a)(4) (2003).
145. See 49 C.F.R. § 365 subpt. E app. A.111(a)(5) (2003) (verifying that drivers Mexican motor carriers
intend to assign to operate in the United States have qualifications consistent with the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations standards and procedures as set forth in title 49, parts 383 and 391 of the Code of Federal
Regulations).
146. 49 C.F.R. § 365 subpt. E app. A.IIl(b) (2003); see also 49 C.F.R. § 365 subpt. E app. A.IV(f)
(2003) (combining Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations with similar characteristics into six areas to
evaluate the adequacy of the carrier's safety management controls).
147. See 49 C.F.R § 365.507(d)-(e) (2003) (assigning a distinctive "USDOT" number that identifies the
motor carrier as authorized to operate in the United States).
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2. Provisional Operating Authority
During the eighteen-month provisional "" operating period, Mexican carriers
are governed by a safety monitoring system to ensure compliance with the
applicable Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.' 49 The safety monitoring
system includes frequent roadside inspections5  and a compliance review. 5' A
compliance review must be conducted by the FMCSA, and a safety rating must
be assigned to the Mexican motor carrier in the eighteen-month provisional
period or the carrier will remain in the safety monitoring system.' If the
Mexican carrier is given a satisfactory safety rating,m the provisional designation
is removed at the end of the eighteen-month provisional period,5 5 provided the
motor carrier's safety record is still in good standing.'56 If the carrier receives an
unsatisfactory rating, the provisional operating authority will be revoked and
suspended if no action is taken to remedy the inadequate safety management
controls. "
In addition to the safety monitoring system requirements, Mexican carriers
are required to have Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance'58 inspections on each
vehicle5 9 every ninety days during the eighteen-month provisional period' 1° and
for three consecutive years after receiving permanent operating authority.' 6' The
148. See 49 C.F.R. § 385.101 (2003) (explaining that operating authority is provisional because it will
be revoked if the Mexican carrier is not assigned a satisfactory safety rating during the safety monitoring
period).
149. 49 C.F.R. § 385.103(a) (2003).
150. 49 C.F.R. § 385.103(b) (2003).
151. See 49 C.F.R. § 385.3 (2003) (defining a compliance review as an on-site examination of motor
carrier operations to determine whether the motor carrier meets the safety fitness standards); see also 49 C.F.R.
§ 385.103(e) (2003) (establishing that a compliance review on the Mexico-domiciled carrier is required within
18 months of issuing provisional operating authority).
152. See 49 C.F.R. § 385.109(a) (2003) (specifying that the criteria used to rate Mexico-domiciled
carriers are found in Appendix B to part 385); see also 49 C.F.R. § 385 app. B (2003) (using data from
compliance reviews and roadside inspections to rate a motor carrier). There are three safety ratings: satisfactory,
conditional or unsatisfactory. Id.
153. 49 C.F.R. § 385.117(c) (2003).
154. 49 C.F.R. § 385.109(b) (2003).
155. See id. (indicating that a satisfactory compliance review does not terminate the 18-month
provisional status of the carrier or the safety monitoring program).
156. 49 C.F.R. § 385.117(b) (2003).
157. 49 C.F.R. § 385.109(c) (2003).
158. See Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, About Us, at http://www.cvsa.org/aboutus/cvsa-aboutus.
htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that Commercial
Vehicle Safety Alliance ("CVSA") is a non-profit organization comprised of government agencies and private
industry in the United States, Canada, and Mexico). The CVSA is dedicated to achieving uniformity and
reciprocity of commercial vehicle inspections throughout North America. Id.
159. See 49 C.F.R. § 385.103(c) (2003) (mandating that every Mexican commercial motor vehicle
operating in the United States must have a current CVSA decal attesting to a satisfactory inspection by a CVSA
inspector).
160. Id.
161. 49C.F.R. § 365.511 (2003).
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regulation requires a "level 1""' inspection,'63 which includes a complete safety
check of the vehicle, an examination of the driver's records, and an alcohol and
drug test of the driver.' 4 The carrier is also required to display a current
inspection decal attesting to the successful completion of the inspection.
The post-moratorium regulatory scheme authorizes the FMCSA to process
applications for Mexico-domiciled motor carriers on a case-by-case basis,
provided the cross-border provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations are applied.' However, the cross-border provisions of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations may conflict with other interests.' 67 These
conflicts are the keystone of the post-moratorium dispute.
III. THE FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO
SATISFY ALL INTERESTS
Complying with NAFTA, ensuring safety on U.S. roads, placing a heavy
burden on Mexican trucking firms, and the continued efforts by protectionists to
block Mexican long-haul trucking are the four major conflicting interests that
affect the Act of 2002's post-moratorium policy. The U.S. cross-border trucking
policy must comply with NAFTA obligations while ensuring safety on U.S.
roads. Moreover, the policy must be flexible enough to allow Mexican trucking
firms a fair chance to compete in the integrated NAFTA market, but strict enough
to withstand the fact that protectionists are likely to capitalize on defects in the
policy. Ultimately, it is unlikely that all the competing interests can be
completely satisfied.
A. NAFTA Compliance
Compliance with NAFTA is one of the competing interests affecting the
post-moratorium policy requirements established by the Act of 2002 for cross-
border trucking. The NAFTA arbitration panel's final report made it clear that
lifting the moratorium was essential for achieving NAFTA compliance.' 6'
162. See Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, Inspections: Inspections Levels, at http://www.cvsa.org/
inspections/inspectionjlevels.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(explaining that there are seven levels of inspection and level I is the most comprehensive).
163. 49 C.F.R. § 365.507(e)(3) (2003).
164. Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, supra note 162, http://www.cvsa.org/inspections/inspection
_levels.htm.
165. 49C.F.R. § 365.511 (2003).
166. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
87, 115 Stat. 833, 864 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13902).
167. See infra notes 168-290 and accompanying text (discussing the potential conflict with NAFTA
rules and the U.S. environmental laws).
168. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S. v. Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-
01, para 295 (Final Report of the Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/
trucking.pdf (stating that the refusal to process Mexican applications for operating authority to provide cross-
border trucking services was a breach of the United States' obligations under NAFTA).
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Certification of the FMCSA border operational plan' 69 and promulgation of cross-
border provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations were the
first steps in lifting the moratorium."' These actions substantially cured the
NAFTA violation.'72 As a result, Mexico-domiciled motor carriers wishing to
establish long-haul service to the United States are individually scrutinized under
the FMCSA regulatory scheme' 73 rather than denied as a group simply because
they are domiciled in Mexico. 4 Nevertheless, the United States may still be in
violation of its NAFTA obligations if the cross-border provisions of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations do not conform to all relevant NAFTA
provisions. 75 Whether the cross-border trucking regulations promulgated by the
FMCSA are NAFTA compliant is an open question'76 that could ultimately turn
on the interpretation of NAFTA rules for "Cross-border Trade in Services."'7
1. National Treatment and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment: NAFTA
Articles 1202 & 1203
One issue that must be addressed is whether the cross-border provisions of
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations comply with NAFTA.
Notwithstanding the dissolution of the blanket moratorium, the cross-border
provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations placed on Mexico-
domiciled trucking firms are not placed on U.S. trucking firms or Canadian
169. See infra notes 223-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Act of 2002 requirement for
certification of the border operations before applications for Mexican carriers can be processed).
170. See infra notes 247-71 and accompanying text (explaining the FMCSA's regulatory scheme for
Mexico-domiciled carriers).
171. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002 § 350(a)
(mandating that funding could not be used to process applications for Mexico-domiciled carriers until the
requirements of the Act of 2002 were implemented).
172. See Price, supra note 88, at 282 (speculating that a failure to certify FMCSA border operations
would have constituted a continued breach of NAFTA obligations). Denial of operating authority based on
border conditions would have been a blanket ban of all Mexican carriers rather than a process based on their
individual qualifications. Id. The United States will continue to be in violation of its NAFTA obligation until
Mexican applications for operational authority are processed on a case-by-case basis. Id.
173. See Bush Memorandum, supra note 15, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/1/print/
20021127-6.html (modifying the moratorium to be consistent with U.S. obligations under NAFTA).
174. See Taylor, supra note 67, at 1246 (pointing out that the moratorium denied new operating permits
to all Mexican trucking firms that sought operating authority beyond the designated commercial zones).
Operating permits for U.S. trucking firms are individually scrutinized. Id.
175. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S. v. Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-
01, para. 301 (Final Report of the Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/
trucking.pdf (finding that if the United States imposes requirements on Mexican carriers that differ from those
imposed on U.S. carriers, then the requirements must be made in good faith with respect to a legitimate safety
concern and conform with all relevant NAFTA provisions).
176. See Atik, supra note 48, at 1250 (explaining that trade in services jurisprudence is relatively
unexplored).
177. See North American Free Trade Agreement § 1201, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993), http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/english/index.html (setting forth that Chapter 12 rules apply to measures relating to cross-border trade
in services including transportation systems).
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trucking firms operating under FMCSA authority."' The NAFTA rules for cross-
border trade in services bar disparity in treatment among the treaty parties under
national treatment 79 or most-favored-nation treatment,' ° codified respectively in
NAFTA Articles 1202... and 1203. 1 2 However, national treatment and most-
favored-nation treatment obligations are only triggered by the "in like
circumstances" language found in Articles 1202 and 1203.183 If the commercial
trucking industries in Mexico and the United States are in like circumstances,
then the "no less favorable" language in Articles 1202 and 1203 is triggered.'8
First, it is necessary to decide whether Mexican and U.S. trucking services
are in like circumstances. In light of the differences ' between the regulatory
regimes for commercial vehicles in Mexico and the United States, it is unclear
whether trucking services on both sides of the border are in fact in like
circumstances.' 86 It is relatively easy to decide if goods being produced by two
different countries are alike and, therefore, should be treated the same under the
terms of a multilateral trade agreement. It is more tenuous to conclude that
service industries such as the trucking industries in Mexico and the United States
are alike and should be treated equally. A truck is a truck under the goods
analysis, but there is more to trucking operations than just the truck. There is also
a human element that must be considered under the service analysis that is not
necessary to the goods analysis. Simply because two trucks, one Mexican and
178. See 49 C.F.R. § 365 (2003) (establishing the Mexican carrier application process for carriers
seeking to operate beyond the commercial zone); see also 49 C.F.R. § 385 (2003) (establishing a safety
monitoring system and compliance initiative for Mexico-domiciled carriers operating in the United States).
179. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADING INTO THE FUTURE 21 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining that
national treatment means equal treatment for foreigners and one's own nationals). Once foreign firms have been
allowed to enter the host country market and provide services therein, there should be no discrimination
between the foreign and domestic companies. Id. at 23.
180. See id. at 21 (explaining that most-favored-nation means treating one's trading partners equally).
Put another way, favor one means favor all. Id.
181. See North American Free Trade Agreement § 1202(1), http://www.nafta-secalena.org/english/
index.html (stating that "[elach party shall accord to service providers of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own service providers.").
182. See id. § 1203 (stating that, "[e]ach party shall accord to service providers of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to service providers of any other Party or
of a non-Party.").
183. See Taylor, supra note 67, at 1244 (explaining that an analysis of trade in services obligations
under NAFTA Articles 1202 and 1203 requires a finding of like circumstances between foreign and domestic
service providers before a determination of less favorable treatment can be established).
184. North American Free Trade Agreement §§ 1202, 1203, http://www.nafta-secalena.org/english/
index.html.
185. See Atik, supra note 48, at 1254 (suggesting that there is ambiguity about whether the NAFTA
arbitration panel believed U.S. and Mexican trucking firms were not in like circumstances, given the disparity
between regulatory regimes in the two countries). Mexico argued that its less restrictive regulatory regime did
not affect the ability of Mexican trucking firms to meet U.S. standards. Id. The United States believed that the
disparity in standards justified differential treatment. Id.
186. See id. at 1250 (noting that the NAFTA arbitration panel reasoned that too broad of an
interpretation of like circumstances is dangerous because it could render Article 1202 meaningless). In contrast,
interpreting like circumstance too narrowly is unacceptable because it would eliminate most service providers
from national treatment protection. Id.
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one U.S., are the same make, model, and year does not mean that the drivers will
be trained the same, the trucks will be maintained the same, and the companies
will be managed the same. Consequently, factors that influence the human
elements of services, like the difference in regulatory regimes, become important
for in like circumstances analysis. Despite the blurred issue of how to determine
when service providers are in like circumstances, the NAFTA arbitration panel
concluded that Articles 1202 and 1203 should apply to the moratorium.' One
can conclude by inference from the NAFTA arbitration panel's final report that
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations must also comply with Articles
1202 and 1203 to survive challenge.
It is also necessary to determine if the cross-border provisions of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations applied to Mexican motor carriers are less
favorable than the safety regulations applied to U.S. and Canadian motor carriers.
Under the regulatory scheme promulgated by the FMCSA, there is a distinct
application process for a Mexican motor carrier"' that requires it to undergo a
pre-authorization safety audit process before operating authority may be granted.89
The pre-authorization safety audit is completely absent from the general application
process applicable to U.S. and Canadian motor carriers.' 9° The FMCSA is
required to verify information in the Mexican application before operational
authority is granted, while the information in the general application is
independently adequate to approve operational authority for U.S. and Canadian
motor carriers.' 9' When a Mexican motor carrier applies for operating authority it
is presumed that the information provided in the application is insufficient, and
the FMSCA must take additional steps to verify that the carrier will comply with
the FMCSA's operational safety policy before authority is granted.', 2 The
difference in treatment at this stage is not likely to trigger national treatment
analysis because the differential treatment occurs prior to a Mexican motor carrier's
entry into the U.S. market. 93 However, the most-favored-nation treatment analysis is
187. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S. v. Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-
01, para. 295 (Final Report of the Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcementU
trucking.pdf (finding that an exception to these NAFTA obligations is not authorized by the in like
circumstance language of Articles 1202 and 1203).
188. See 49 C.F.R. § 365.105 (2003) (providing a distinct form "OP-I (MX)" for Mexico-domiciled
motor carriers).
189. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-authorization safety audit).
190. Compare 49 C.F.R. § 365 subpt. A (2003) (setting forth the general provisions on the application
process for operating authority), with 49 C.F.R. § 365 subpt. E (2003) (setting forth special rules for the
application process of Mexico-domiciled carriers).
191. Compare 49 C.F.R. § 365.109(a) (2003) (requiring that the FMCSA review the applications for
correctness, completeness, and adequacy of the evidence and accepting applications that are in substantial
compliance), with 49 C.F.R. § 365.507(b)-(c) (2003) (requiring the FMCSA to verify the validity of the
information by checking Mexican and U.S. databases and conduct a pre-authorization safety audit before
approving an application).
192. See 49 C.F.R. § 365.507(b)-(c) (mandating that the FMCSA verify the information in the
application before approval).
193. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 179, at 21 (explaining that national treatment only
applies once a service provider has entered the market).
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triggered by the fact that the same general application procedures applied to U.S.
domestic trucking firms also govern the application process for Canadian
trucking firms.' 94 Therefore, Mexico can demand most-favored-nation treatment
based on the treatment extended to Canadian trucking firms at entry into the U.S.
market.
If operating authority is granted, Mexico-domiciled motor carriers are
scrutinized differently than "new entrant" U.S. and Canadian domiciled
carriers. 95 During the first eighteen months of operations, Mexican trucking
companies are governed by a safety monitoring system.' 9' A less rigorous safety
assurance program is required for U.S. and Canadian domestic motor carriers.,97
Mexican trucks are subject to frequent roadside monitoring and must undergo
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance inspections every ninety days in addition to
successfully completing a compliance review before permanent authority will be
granted. 98 At this stage, the Mexican motor carrier will have entered the U.S.
market and triggered national treatment protection in addition to most-favored-
nation treatment.' 99 Therefore, Mexican trucks must be treated no less favorable
than the U.S. and Canadian trucking firms operating in the U.S. market.
However, application of the no less favorable language found in Articles
1202 and 1203 also turns on how it is interpreted. The NAFTA arbitration panel
stated that a limited degree of differential treatment might be justifiable if it is for
legitimate regulatory reasons and it is equivalent to treatment accorded to
domestic service providers." Therefore, differential treatment under national
treatment and most-favored-nation treatment analysis is not automatically less
favorable for two reasons.
First, it must be determined whether or not the regulatory scheme is designed
to address a legitimate issue such as transportation safety.20' The fear is that
Mexican motor carriers will not comply with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
194. See Taylor, supra note 67, at 1247 (discussing the NAFTA arbitration panel's analysis that most-
favored-nation treatment would be the same as national treatment because the FMCSA treats Canadian motor
carriers exactly the same as U.S motor carriers).
195. See 49 C.F.R. § 385.3 (2003) (defining "new entrant" as a motor carrier not domiciled in Mexico).
196. See 49 C.F.R. § 385 subpt. B (2003) (establishing provisions for the safety monitoring of Mexico-
domiciled carriers).
197. See 49 C.F.R. § 385 subpt. A (2003) (setting forth the safety assurance program for "new entrant"
motor carriers); see also 49 C.F.R. § 385.307 (2003) (subjecting new entrant motor carriers to eighteen months
of safety monitoring procedures, including close monitoring of roadside performance and a safety audit).
198. See supra notes 148-65 and accompanying text (discussing provisional operating authority).
199. See Taylor, supra note 67, at 1244 (explaining that Canadian motor carriers are treated the same as
U.S. motor carriers). In this case, the analysis is the same for national treatment or most-favored-nation because
under either provision the Mexican motor carrier can demand no less favorable treatment. Id.
200. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S. v. Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-
01, para. 258 (Final Report of the Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcementl
trucking.pdf (stating that language in Articles 1202 and 1203 should not be interpreted to permit significant
barriers to NAFTA trade).
201. See Atik, supra note 48, at 1250 (indicating that the design and efficiency of the regulatory scheme
is relevant when testing it against national treatment obligations).
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Regulations unless there are additional provisions to ensure compliance. 202 The
counterargument is that the fear was never a legitimate concern, but rather a
tactic to protect other U.S. interests such as American jobs.20 3 The NAFTA
arbitration panel declined to examine the U.S. motivation for maintaining the
moratorium and instead confined its analysis to whether or not the action was
compliant with NAFTA. 2°4 Without objective evidence to dispel the potential
safety issues that Mexican trucks present, it is possible that a future inquiry about
the legitimacy of the FMCSA's regulatory scheme would be similarly confined
despite signs of protectionist influence in crafting the cross-border provisions of
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. On the other hand, the NAFTA
arbitration panel may have confined its inquiry to compliance with NAFTA
because the moratorium was such a substantial restriction on trade that it was
unnecessary to look at the U.S. motivation before deciding that it could not be
legitimate.' °5 The extent to which the cross-border provisions of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations will restrict trade is not as clear as it was in the
case of the moratorium. That fact may trigger a deeper inquiry to determine the
legitimacy of the FMCSA's regulatory scheme.
Second, it must be determined whether or not the cross-border provisions of
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations as applied to Mexican motor
carriers are equivalent to the treatment accorded to domestic motor carriers. The
regulations are likely to create additional operating costs for Mexican motor
carriers not incurred by U.S. and Canadian trucking firms. 20 For example,
Mexican motor carriers must extend greater resources than Canadian motor
carriers to gain entry into the U.S. market because of the more rigorous
application process. Furthermore, Mexican motor carriers may also have
additional contractual difficulties during the first eighteen months of operation
because of the conditional nature of the provisional operating authority.2°8 In spite
of these disadvantages, Mexican trucking firms governed by Mexico's less
demanding regulatory regime are only being asked to extend the same resources
demanded of U.S. and Canadian trucking firms operating in the U.S. market. In
this light, differential treatment for Mexican motor carriers actually creates
equivalency between competing trucking firms. Therefore, national treatment or
202. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services at para. 298, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
enforcementltrucking.pdf (declining to determine if the safety of trucking services is a legitimate regulatory
objective).
203. See Atik, supra note 48, at 1251 (postulating that suspicion of protectionist intent will doom the
legitimacy of differential treatment under national treatment analysis).
204. In re Cross-Border Trucking Services at para. 214, available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/
trucking.pdf.
205. Id. at para. 269.
206. GAO Report No. 02-238, supra note 40, at 7.
207. See supra notes 127-67 and accompanying text (discussing the regulatory scheme for Mexican
motor carriers).
208. See GAO Report No. 02-238, supra note 40, at 10 (explaining that the uncertainty about the rules
for obtaining operating authority makes it difficult to plan for the future since contracts and distribution ties
must be established in advance).
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most-favored-nation treatment does not necessarily bar the differential nature of
the cross-border provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.
2. General Exceptions Provisions: NAFTA Article 2101
Even if the cross-border provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations are more burdensome than national treatment or most-favored-nation
treatment allows, they may still be justified under NAFTA's general exceptions
2090provisions.20 Under Article 2101 of NAFTA,2 ° the United States could justify its
regulatory scheme as necessary to secure compliance with other non-
discriminatory U.S. laws.2 ' However, the NAFTA arbitration panel interpreted
Article 2101 narrowly.' The NAFTA arbitration panel found that for the cross-
border provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations to be NAFTA-
legal, they must entail the least degree of inconsistency with other NAFTA
provisions."' In the NAFTA arbitration panel's decision, the moratorium was not
found to be the least trade-restrictive measure available to deal with the safety
concerns regarding Mexican trucks. 214 The cross-border provision of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, on the other hand, may be within the narrow
range of Article 2101 as interpreted by the NAFTA arbitration panel. The reason
for the added regulatory layer is to ensure that Mexican trucks comply with all
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. The intent of the pre-authorization
safety audit and the safety monitoring system during the first eighteen months is
designed to ensure that Mexican carriers have the requisite tools to comply with
all Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations."' For example, one function of a
pre-authorization safety audit is to secure compliance with Federal hours-of-
216service requirements. The safety monitoring system has a similar application.
All motor carriers must have a satisfactory safety rating to maintain operating
authority.2 7 The safety rating is based on data collected from the compliance
review."' In the case of Mexican long-haul trucks, there is less trucking datagenerated by Mexico's domestic regulatory regime. Therefore, a greater
209. See Taylor, supra note 67, at 1246 (discussing Article 2101 of the NAFTA). Article 2101 allows
exceptions to NAFTA obligations when they are necessary to secure compliance with domestic laws. Id.
210. See North American Free Trade Agreement § 2101(2), 107 Stat. 2057 (1993), http://www.nafta-
sec-alena.org/english/index.html (providing general exceptions to Chapter 12 obligations).
211. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S. v. Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-
01, para. 262 (Final Report of the Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/
trucking.pdf (importing GATI'IWTO jurisprudence to the interpret NAFTA).
212. See id. at para. 263 (explaining the narrow interpretation under GATT Article XX exceptions).
213. See id. at para. 270 (importing language from the Reformulated Gasoline case).
214. Taylor, supra note 67, at 1246.
215. See supra notes 127-67 and accompanying text (explaining the FMCSA's regulatory scheme for
Mexico-domiciled motor carriers).
216. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text (providing examples of Federal standards that apply
to all motor carriers operating on U.S. roads).
217. 49 C.F.R. 390.3 (2003).
218. See 49 C.F.R. 385.3 (2003) (setting the standards for compliance review of all motor carriers).
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frequency of roadside monitoring and Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
inspections are necessary to generate essential data for the required compliance
review and, ultimately, issue a safety rating.
If a strong connection is established between the cross-border provisions of the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and the need to ensure compliance with
other domestic safety regulations, there is still a possibility that a less restrictive method
is available to meet these concerns."9 If the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations
without the cross-border provisions tailored for Mexican motor carriers would
effectively address the relevant safety concerns, then the added regulatory layers are
220too restrictive under NAFTA's Article 2101 general exceptions analysis. However,
because Mexico does not have equivalent regulatory requirements to the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations from which some initial presumption of compliance might
be formed, the added regulatory layers are necessary to guarantee that Mexican
trucking companies will operate in compliance with all the relevant Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations prior to the first compliance review, which is not required
under the FMCSA's regulatory scheme until months after authority is granted. 2 1
Concluding that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations as applied to
Mexico are a breach of NAFTA will not be as easy to prove as it was in the case of
the prior moratorium. To the extent that Mexico's regulatory standards for the
trucking industry may not be like U.S. standards, different methods of ensuring
compliance with the U.S. regulatory regime may be justified even under national
treatment and most-favored-nation treatment analysis. 2 Therefore, Mexico does
not have a clear claim of impermissible discrimination under Chapter 12 of
NAFTA. Furthermore, the cross-border provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations are likely to fall into the narrow category of NAFTA's Article
2101 exceptions. Mexico should focus its efforts toward operating under the
current Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, at least until there is objective
data to counter the legitimacy of the safety concerns.
B. Ensuring Safety on U.S. Roads
Opening the U.S. border for Mexican long-haul trucks while maintaining
transportation safety on U.S roads is a second interest influencing the post-
moratorium policy established by the Act of 2002. While the FMCSA's
regulatory scheme faces difficulties in complying with NAFTA for being too
219. See Taylor, supra note 67, at 1246 (explaining that the NAFTA arbitration panel does not discuss
what the least restrictive measure might be). It only found that the moratorium was not the least restrictive
measure. Id.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional objections to rules less
restrictive than those ultimately required by the Act of 2002).
222. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S. v. Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-
01, para. 298 (Final Report of the Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/
trucking.pdf (leaving open the question whether NAFTA parties may set the level of protection that they
consider appropriate in pursuit of legitimate regulatory objectives).
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restrictive, there is also a potential clash with interest groups who have
campaigned for more restrictive regulations to ensure safety.i2 The possibility of
a continued dispute over safety concerns will turn on the efficiency of the
FMCSA border operational plan and the subsequent safety record of Mexican
long-haul trucks operating in the United States under FMCSA authority.
1. Improvements in the Border Operational Plan
The FMCSA border operational plan addressed many of the deficiencies
associated with cross-border trucks entering the United States from Mexico.1
4
The FMCSA's implementation of the requirements set forth in the Act of 2002
provides a more effective border operational plan designed to deter unsafe trucks
from entering the United States.22 Only Mexican motor carriers able to
demonstrate the required safety management controls will be granted permanent
authority to operate in the United States 6 Furthermore, an increase in the
inspection facilities and personnel at the U.S.-Mexico border will increase the
rate of vehicle safety inspections of Mexican trucks entering the United States.
27
An increased rate of inspection is likely to lead to a decrease in the number of
trucks failing inspection because the related out-of-service costs will reduce the
incentive to use sub-standard trucks. 2  Finally, FMCSA plans to differentiate
between the data collected on Mexican drayage trucks and on long-haul trucks29
will be an important element for accurately evaluating the safety compliance of
Mexican trucks. 23°
Two areas of uncertainty that could cause continued dispute over the border
operational plan are the number of Mexican trucks that must be inspected at the
223. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 248-52 (discussing the safety concerns advanced by public interest
groups and labor unions).
224. See id. at 246-48 (discussing a trilogy of government reports that detail safety concerns regarding
cross-border trucking). One report focused on the disparity in trucking regulations between Mexico and the
United States. Id. at 246-47. A second report focused on the shortage of border inspection facilities and
personnel. Id. at 247. A third report highlighted Mexican trucks that were violating U.S. law without
consequences. Id. at 247-48.
225. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
87, § 350, 115 Stat. 833, 864 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13902).
226. See supra notes 148-67 and accompanying text (discussing operational authority for Mexico-
domiciled motor carriers).
227. See Messenger, supra note 5, at 621 (stating that approximately one-third of Mexican trucks
crossing the border were inspected prior to the Act of 2002 improvements).
228. See id. at 621-22 (suggesting that border crossings with a higher frequency of inspections have
lower truck failure rates). At California border crossings the Mexican truck failure rate was 27% as compared to
41% at Texas border crossings. Id. at 622.
229. See GAO Report No. 02-238, supra note 40, at 19 (explaining that the FMCSA plans to measure
Mexican carrier compliance with U.S. safety standards by using truck out-of-service rates, traffic fatality rates,
and accident rates).
230. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 258-59 (explaining that the safety data on the Mexican drayage fleet
is not a fair representation of the Mexican trucking industry).
2003/NAFTA Keep on Truckin'
border crossings23' and the coordination of inspection responsibility between state
and federal enforcement officials."' The Act of 2002 makes no specific
requirement as to the number of Mexican long-haul trucks that must be inspected
at the border or the allocation of federal-state responsibility for inspecting
trucks' 3 Presumably, there will be sufficient inspections given the increase in
FMCSA personnel2 and the improved infrastructure required by the Act of
2002. 2" The border states have also received funding under the Act of 2002 to
increase the level of inspection resources at the border. 21' Furthermore, the initial
number of Mexican long-haul trucks expected to operate under FMCSA authority
is small. 2" However, lower percentages of Mexican truck inspections at the
border crossings are likely to send up a red flag for interest groups motivated to
231
attack the operational plan. In addition to the potential for low rates of
inspection, agreements have not been completed with border states on how to
allocate inspections between state and federal enforcement officers. 39 Only two
border states, California and Arizona, have enacted legislation authorizing state
law enforcement to take action against a commercial vehicle that operates
beyond the commercial zones without FMCSA authority. Although the
remaining defects in the border operational plans are minimal, protectionists are
likely to capitalize on those defects if they result in unsafe Mexican trucks
operating on U.S. roads.
2. Improvements in the Mexican Regulatory Regime
Uncertainty about whether Mexican trucks will comply with U.S. safety
standards is based on Mexico's less stringent regulatory regime. Improvements
of Mexican domestic trucking regulations will significantly lessen that
231. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
87, § 350(c)(1)(F), 115 Stat. 833, 864 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13902) (requiring a finding that
there is adequate capacity at each border crossing to conduct a sufficient number of meaningful vehicle
inspections).
232. GAO Report No. 02-238, supra note 40, at 19.
233. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002 § 350.
234. See id § 350(c)(1)(A) (requiring the IG to verify that all new inspector positions funded by the Act
of 2002 are filled).
235. See Mead Statement, supra note 103 (finding that the FMCSA planned to hire 214 new border
inspectors).
236. See Mead Memorandum, supra note 102 (explaining that the Act of 2002 allocates $18 million to
border states for inspection).
237. See Press Release, supra note 125, at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dotl0702.htm (indicating that
only 130 applications have been received by the FMCSA).
238. See Mead Memorandum, supra note 102 (explaining that there is a correlation between the
frequency of inspection and the condition of Mexican trucks entering the United States). More border
inspections will result in better Mexican truck safety records. Id.
239. See GAO Report No. 02-238, supra note 40, at 3 (reporting that Department of Transportation
officials have not made progress toward a coordinated operational plan).
240. See Mead Memorandum, supra note 102 (calling the attention of the Secretary of Transportation
and Congress to the absence of state legislation).
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uncertainty. Mexico has taken steps to implement compatible commercial vehicle
safety regulations. In July of 2001, Mexico implemented commercial vehicle
inspection regulations. 4' By 2006, Mexican officials plan to have increased the
number of inspections per year to fifty percent of the total commercial motor
fleet.242 Mexico has plans to complete construction of twenty inspection facilities
by the end of 2003.243 Mexico has also established additional driver training
requirements for issuing and renewing commercial driver's licenses.244 In
addition, five Mexican databases accessible by U.S. enforcement authorities have
been created to verify important driver and motor carrier information. W
If the safety record of Mexican long-haul trucks is found to be comparable to
U.S. domiciled long-haul trucks, the FMCSA will have achieved its goal.2
Conversely, a poor safety record on Mexican long-haul trucks would be a strong
indicator that the FMCSA operational plan is not sufficiently deterring unsafe
Mexican trucks from crossing the border. Because Mexican long-haul trucks will
be stringently scrutinized under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, it
seems inevitable that the Mexican long-haul trucks will attain a safety record
equivalent to U.S. trucks. Ironically, a good Mexican long-haul safety record
could prove that prior data collected on drayage trucks was misleading. Mexico
could also argue that improved commercial transportation regulations in Mexico
should be credited for a satisfactory safety record. Either way, the safety
concerns that justified the more stringent regulatory scheme because they were
based on inaccurate data or insignificant differences in regulatory regimes
between Mexico and the United States will diminish the legitimacy of differential
treatment.
C. The Heavy Burden Placed on Mexican Trucking Firms
The heavy burden placed on the Mexican commercial trucking companies is
a third concern affecting the implementation of the post-moratorium policy
established by the Act of 2002. Even in the absence of a moratorium, few
Mexican motor carriers may be able to absorb the inflated operational costs
associated with establishing operations beyond the commercial zones. 247 In
addition to the extra entry burdens, 48 there are several other factors likely to
create a long-term competitive disadvantage for Mexican trucking companies
operating long-haul trucks in the U.S. market under the policy established by the
241. GAO Report No. 02-238, supra note 40, at 21.
242. Id. at 22.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 23.
246. Id. at 19.
247. See id. at 7 (explaining that a number of economic and regulatory factors may limit Mexican long-
haul operations in the United States).
248. See notes 168-290 accompanying text (discussing the cross-border provisions of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations).
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Act of 2002. Two factors that could delay a shift from the drayage system to a
long-haul system are the availability of competitively priced insurance and
continued border congestion.
1. Availability of U.S. Licensed Insurance
Unavailability of U.S. insurance may create a barrier that effectively pushes
trucking operational costs to an unprofitable level. 49 The Act of 2002 requires
Mexican motor carriers operating in the United States to carry insurance with a
U.S. licensed insurer." ° However, the meaning of "insurance company licensed
in the United States" is uncertain.25' A narrow interpretation of the statutory
language significantly limits the kind of insurance companies that may offer
insurance to Mexican motor carriers because it would eliminate participation by
all non-U.S. licensed insurers.2" Such an interpretation of the term "U.S. licensed
insurer" prolongs unaffordable insurance costs, preventing Mexican long-haul
carriers from gaining practical access to U.S. markets with the same
discriminatory effect as the moratorium condemned by the NAFTA arbitration
panel. 253
In addition, other insurance industry related factors limit the number of
insurance companies willing to insure Mexican trucks.) Only a few U.S.
insurance companies have shown interest in the market because it is anticipated
that only a small number of Mexican motor carriers will initially operate in the
U.S. market.255 Furthermore, U.S. insurance companies are challenged by the
absence of good underwriting information in order to assess the risk of insuring
Mexican trucks.2 56 These factors create more risk and work for the insurer,
resulting in higher costs for the insured.257
249. Price, supra note 88, at 282.
250. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-87, § 350(a)(8), 115 Stat. 833, 864 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13902) (prohibiting the FMCSA
from granting U.S. operating authority to Mexican carriers unless the carrier provides proof of valid insurance
with an insurance company licensed in the United States).
25 1. See id. (quoting the statutory language).
252. See Few Mexican Trucks Expected, INS. ACCr., July 1, 2002, at 10, available at 2002 WL 4770767
(explaining that this issue was a potential point of controversy since a narrow interpretation of the statutory
language would have excluded the companies most interested in offering insurance to Mexican trucking
companies operating in the United States).
253. See Price, supra note 88, at 281-82 (postulating that conditions preventing Mexican carriers from
obtaining operational authority in the United States should be based on the qualifications of the individual
motor carrier). Preventing a Mexican truck from obtaining operational authority based on the unavailability of
affordable insurance seems to work as a blanket moratorium.
254. See Few Mexican Truck Expected, supra note 252 (mentioning that the reluctance stems from fear
of the initial cost).
255. See id. (emphasizing that the insurance companies need lots of business to make the law of large
numbers work).
256. See id. (indicating that good underwriting information will be critical to lower cost for insurance).
257. Id.
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A limited supply of insurance providers will keep costs high and perpetuate
the competitive disadvantage between Mexican motor carriers and U.S. motor
carriers. The problem will partially resolve itself as the number of Mexican
motor carriers participating in long-haul operations in the United States
increases. Over time, the presence of more Mexican trucks on U.S. roads and
better methods to appraise risk will make the market more profitable and
attractive for U.S insurance companies. In addition, a broad interpretation of the
term "U.S. licensed insurer" will expand the insurance options available to
Mexican trucking companies because it allows non-U.S. licensed surplus lines
companies to offer coverage through the admitted U.S. licensed insurers.5 An
increase in the sources of insurance coverage will maximize the available capital
to draw on and lower rates for Mexican motor carriers. 59
2. Border-Crossing Congestion
Border congestion is another factor that creates a competitive disadvantage
for Mexican long-haul operations. To meet the standards of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations, Mexican carriers will have to dedicate newer vehicles
and more experienced drivers to long-haul operations.2 6° It is costly to have
expensive equipment and higher paid drivers sitting in gridlock at the border.26 '
This is one reason that older, less expensive trucks and personnel were favored in
the drayage system. 62 However, if the FMCSA efficiently manages border
263
operations, the congestion and associated cost could be minimized. On the
other hand, long delays at the border would make it more advantageous to
continue using the drayage system. 264 Accordingly, incentives to shift operations
from the drayage system to a long-haul system are unlikely unless congestion is
265
reduced at the border. Ironically, the more restrictive requirements of the Act of
2002 may ultimately favor a long-haul system because drastic improvements in
the operational plan for cross-border trucking had to be made before Mexican
long-haul truck applications for operational authority could be processed.
26
Significant improvements in infrastructure and increased border personnel should
258. See id. (advocating a broad interpretation by the federal government to allow more companies to
offer insurance to Mexican carriers).
259. Meg Fletcher, NAFTA Trucking Legislation Steering Toward Enactment: But Insurance Provision
Raising Questions, BUS. INS., Dec. 10, 2001, at 3.
260. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 260 (explaining that older trucks are likely to fail the standards
necessary to gain entry).
261. Id.at258-59.
262. Id.
263. See id. (explaining that the drayage system was essentially mandated by the moratorium).
264. See id. (suggesting that there was no economic incentive to use safer trucks when the moratorium
was in effect).
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 89-126 and accompanying text (discussing the implementation of the cross-border
operational plan).
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result in a reduction in the time required to cross the border. 67 Furthermore,
increased inspections of truck traffic at the border is likely to result from
268improved border operations. Consequently, trucks out of compliance with
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations are now more likely to be taken out of
service. Because the older equipment traditionally dedicated to drayage
operations will be inspected more frequently and is more likely to fail inspection,
the incentive to use this equipment will decrease.2' ° Newer equipment dedicated




If cross-border operations are too costly only a few Mexican carriers will
have the financial means to sustain long-haul operations in the United States. On
the other hand, if the higher cost of compliance is short-term more Mexican
trucking firms will be able to absorb temporary disadvantages to get the long-
haul trucks rolling and abandon the menacing drayage system. However, there
are equally powerful incentives for protectionists to prolong these barriers for as
long as possible.
D. Protectionists' Continued Effort to Block Mexican Long-Haul Trucks
A final interest affected by the post-moratorium policy established by the Act of
2002 is U.S. job protectionism. The protectionists' methods to further delay cross-
border trucking must be considered. If improved border operations and the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations legitimately address U.S. safety concerns, then
protectionists will need a new battle cry to stop the diesels from rumbling across the
border. As a method to further prolong the dispute, protectionists have formed a
partnership with those who have legitimate concerns about the environmental
impact of Mexican long-haul trucks on the health of U.S. citizens
A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, to which the
Teamsters were a party, is responsible for the latest round of delay in the NAFTA
trucking dispute.272 A three-judge panel decided that the Department of
Transportation failed to do the necessary environmental impact studies on the
rules promulgated by the FMCSA to initiate cross-border trucking service
between Mexico and the United States.27 ' The court held that the Department of
Transportation failed to comport with U.S. environmental law.274 Specifically, the
Department of Transportation should have prepared an Environmental Impact
267. See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text (discussing the IG findings).
268. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (discussing inspection rates at the border).
269. See Messenger, supra note 5, at 621 (estimating that only one-third of Mexican trucks crossing the
border were inspected).
270. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 260 (suggesting that using older equipment presents a higher risk of
financial loss).
271. Id.
272. Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2003).
273. Id. at 1032.
274. Id.
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Statement in accordance with the National Environmental Protection Act 27' and a
conformity determination in accordance with the Clean Air Act.
211
Although President Bush lifted the moratorium that prohibited the FMCSA from
processing Mexican applications for operational authority, 277 the Act of 2002
continues to prohibit the FMCSA from processing Mexican applications until the
rules required by the Act of 2002 are in force.2" The Ninth Circuit decision prevents
the FMCSA from using the rules established for cross-border trucking until the
appropriate environmental studies are completed.279 Notwithstanding the lifting of the
moratorium, the United States remains in breach of its NAFTA obligations.8m The
NAFTA arbitration panel concluded that the United States had to process Mexican
long-haul applications on a case-by-case basis. 8' However, the Ninth Circuit decision
in effect reinstates the moratorium despite the efforts of the President and Congress. It
bans all trucks of Mexican origin without regard for individual ability. This is exactly
the kind of restriction that the NAFTA arbitration panel previously condemned.
The Department of Transportation has two choices at this stage, appeal the Ninth
Circuit decision or comply with the judicial order.21 Either way, the FMCSA's action
on Mexican applications will be delayed at least six more months.2" The Department
of Transportation will most likely comply with the judicial order and prepare the
Environmental Impact Statement and conformity determination ordered by the court.2 8
However, this will not be the end of the environmental battle. The Environmental
Impact Statement and conformity determination findings will, in all likelihood, be
challenged in the U.S. court system. Like the safety dispute, the environmental impact
of Mexican trucks on U.S. roads will be equally illusive. As the Ninth Circuit pointed
out, emissions standards in Mexico are not as strict as U.S. standards.285 Furthermore,
2816the number of Mexican trucks meeting U.S. emissions standards remains unknown.
275. National Environmental Protection Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
276. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
277. See Bush Memorandum, supra note 15, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/l I/
print/20021127-6.html (announcing that the moratorium would be lifted).
278. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
87, § 350(a), 115 Stat. 833, 864 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13902).
279. See Pub. Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1032 (remanding to the Department of Transportation for a full
Environmental Impact Statement and Clean Air Act conformity determination for the three regulations).
280. In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S. v. Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01,
para. 295 (Final Report of the Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement. trucking.pdf.
281. Id. at para. 300.
282. Our Turn: Court's Truck Ruling Another Roadblock, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 24, 2003,
at 6B, available at 2003 WL 5584295.
283. See id. (indicating that the appeal process would take longer than the six months required to do the
environmental study).
284. Id.
285. See Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (criticizing the
Department of Transportation for not citing any known Mexican government plans to improve emissions
standards beyond the current requirements).
286. See id. at 1025 (discussing the Department of Transportation's determination that one-third of
Mexican trucks were identical to U.S. trucks manufactured after 1994 baseless). In 1994, Mexican emissions
standards were made identical to U.S. standards. Id.
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It is also unknown how many Mexican trucks will cross the border and to what extent
they will harm the environment."' The lesson learned from the safety debate is that
protectionists will take advantage of the unknowns."' In the absence of facts,
protectionists will focus on the worst-case scenario.2 9
The number of willing Mexican motor carriers is likely to be small at first, but
booming NAFTA business could eventually attract a larger number of new cross-
border trucking service providers, causing further alarm for protectionists.290 Not
surprisingly, alternative issues that once took a back seat to safety issues now serve as
the next stage of objection to Mexican long-haul trucking. When the environmental
issue has been exhausted, other issues such as illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and
homeland security will be used to produce the same kind of passionate objection and
public outcry. In the end, the only way to preempt endless delay will be to address the
real motivation for continued obstruction, protecting American truckers from Mexican
competition.
IV. CONCLUSION: ENDING THE DISPUTE
U.S. policy makers have made progress toward resolving the NAFTA
trucking dispute with the implementation of the border operational plan and the
cross-border provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. These
actions bring the United States closer to honoring NAFTA, address the
transportation safety concerns on U.S. roads, and represent manageable burdens
for Mexican trucking companies. Nevertheless, policy makers have failed to
understand that some public interest groups will continue to promote delay if it
protects American jobs from competition. The Ninth Circuit decision is a prime
example of protectionist vigor. Notwithstanding this latest victory, one fact
remains: excluding Mexican trucks simply because they are owned by Mexico-
domiciled companies is a dangerous policy choice for the United States.
Trucking is an essential NAFTA service. If the dispute remains unresolved, it
will spoil a decade of free trade policy success.
Legitimate issues regarding safety, the environment, and homeland security
should not be ignored. However, these same issues should not be used as
weapons to delay progress toward implementing binding international
obligations. The effect is counter-productive. Delaying Mexican long-haul trucks
access to the United States only serves to preserve the drayage system, a system
287. See id. at 1023 (stating that the Department of Transportation failed to consider the possibility of
increased numbers of Mexican trucks that may enter the United States as a result of the new regulations). The
Court also criticized the Department of Transportation for not taking a closer look at regional impact of the
regulations. Id. The Department of Transportation found that increased emissions from Mexican trucks would
be very small relative to national levels of emissions. Id.
288. See Sheppard, supra note 6, at 252 (stating that "the safety argument has been repeatedly used
because its scandalous nature tends to dominate the debate, infuriate the general public and obfuscate the
issue.").
289. See id. at 257 (suggesting that NAFTA opponents distort statistics to mislead and scare the public).
290. Simon, supra note 11.
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that is less safe, less environmentally friendly, less secure, and less efficient. A
better solution would be to admit that a competitive fleet of Mexican long-haul
trucks could harm job security for U.S. truckers. U.S. job protectionism is not
necessarily an illegitimate issue, but disguising it with other issues only serves to
delay resolution. If the fear is real, then U.S. policy makers should focus on
minimizing the harm caused to U.S. jobs by Mexican competition. The
alternative is to accept endless delay that prevents the implementation of a better
system of transporting goods between NAFTA partners and harms the
international reputation of the United States.

